An in-depth analysis of Manchester United’s four major ailments!

As Amorin's 35th Premier League match at the arrival of Manchester United, the team only ranked 10th in the league and lost the goal. Amorin's personal coaching data looks even worse - he averaged only 1.03 points per game.

Manchester United's familiar cycle - from "New Hope" to "firing the coach" - took less than ten months this time. The rapid collapse is a sign that the club still seems to be missing where the road is. Here we analyze the root causes of Manchester United's trouble.

1. Insli Group has not yet defined the appearance of the "new Manchester United"

, and the decision to retain Tenghager in the summer of 2024 now seems increasingly debatable. Ratcliffe and his Insli Group team at the time defended the decision at the time for the reason Tenghager's achievements in developing young players (we will "generously" ignore Garnacho's turbulent year) and the FA Cup victory.

Even at that time, it was untenable to use a random cup champion as the basis for staying. In hindsight, this was more of a stopgap trick to please fans, who were still immersed in the winning dopamine and were willing to ignore the Dutch coach's flaws.

By the fall of 2024, Manchester United quietly admitted their mistakes, paid a £10.4 million termination fee to fire Tenhager, and blamed former sports director Dan Asheworth, who was also dismissed shortly afterward.

media reports not only link the decision to keep Tenhager (which Ratcliffe said had opposed) to Ashworth, but also said he explored Southgate and Porter as potential alternatives. After that, CEO Omar Berrada took over and flew to Lisbon to meet Portugal Sports and brought back Amorin.

Even under the leadership of the new owner, Manchester United still seems confused in terms of identity. The club has not decided what kind of football it wants to play - should it lead the ball control or be good at offense and defense conversion, should it be pressing at high positions or to retreat in depth and maintain a compact formation?

The team lacks the core philosophy that defines its style and does not have a framework to ensure continuity or long-term development. Any top club needs a fundamental philosophy that can adapt to the league and continue to evolve – and surprisingly, Manchester United still lacks that.

2. Structural chaos: The situation around Bruno Fernandez at the end of the 2024/25 season fully exposed the structural chaos of Manchester United.

Saudi team Riyadh Crescent launched a heavy-handed bid for Manchester United captain:

* Their offer is worth at least £80 million, and some insiders revealed that the figures even exceeded £100 million, which will break the Premier League transfer fee record.

* They provided Bruno with an annual after-tax salary of £21 million.

* His agent reportedly met with Riyadh Crescent executives twice, and Bruno himself was open to the transfer.

However, after a month of negotiations, Fernandez refused the transfer. On June 3, Romano confirmed that the midfielder decided to stay in Europe despite the huge financial plan provided by Saudi Arabia.

From an emotional point of view, this is an admirable decision. But from a structural point of view, this once again highlights Manchester United's lack of planning. The media interpreted the story as Insli Group respecting Bruno’s personal choice – but in fact, the entire direction of the Manchester United midfielder is determined by their captain, his family and his personal ambitions.

What determines the future of club sports is not an active strategic meeting at the Carrington base, but a discussion at the Bruno's dinner table. This is not vision—this is going with the flow.

Leaving Fernandez means a way of playing; selling him and rebuilding around new features requires a completely different shift in tactical thinking. Instead of promising any plan, Manchester United hesitated to shift the blame to a comfortable gray area.

If Bruno stays--good, the loyal captain stayed in the tough times. If he leaves—it is understandable, he won the opportunity to make a lot of money after five years of setbacks. Either way, leadership avoids taking responsibility.

This once again reflects the club's lack of clear and coherent understanding of where it is going and what football style it should represent. In fact, Manchester United missed a net profit and a chance to completely rebuild the midfield.

Instead, they forced Bruno Fernandez to play an awkward character that exposed all his weaknesses—tactical discipline, man-taught, defensive awareness, positional responsibilities—while also cuts off the latter’s playing time by making Menu his direct competitor. Interestingly, four months after Bruno rejected Saudi offers, even journalists close to the club have not yet been clearly explained. The only detail that surfaced was Amorin insisting on leaving Bruno.

Manchester United did not strengthen the corresponding area around Fernandez. The board of directors determined that signing a high-yield shooter was more urgent than improving midfield balance, and spent 76.5 million euros to sign Xie Shikho in the late summer window. Prioritizing forwards over defensive midfielders was the decision of sports director Jason Wilcox. As a result, Manchester United entered the new season with Bruno, Menu, Casemiro and Ugat as midfielder choices.

In the three-midfield system, responsibilities can be divided: one person covers the space and confrontation, the other person advances through passing, and the third person advances through holding the ball or controls the rhythm. The best trio is a combination of players who are top-notch and otherwise qualified in two skills. In a dual midfield system, the requirement is a sharp rise - it's not enough to do well in one or two areas, you have to reach the top level in multiple skills.

The start of the league shows that Manchester United's midfield is neither balanced nor lacks high quality. Amorin himself was full of energy when he first arrived, but after a few months at Manchester United, he was joking—perhaps not a joke—that he was ten years older.

If the project does not have a clear direction, it is unlikely that the board will find a head coach who can simultaneously provide tactical competitiveness, establish authority in the locker room, adapt when necessary, and maintain consistency in philosophy. Anyone on the shortlist will inevitably face one of the same problems that have tripped over his predecessor.

The Athletic reported that even if United loses to Sunderland, Amorin will remain; Ratcliffe reportedly hopes to give him a full season. Perhaps it was an attempt to break the cycle where clubs usually fired their boss in a crisis—or, it was a fear of admitting mistakes, as Ratcliff personally approved the appointment of Reuben, and no one is now available to hold accountable.

This looks like another dead end, again!